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Abstract 
 
Since it came into office in 2010, the British Coalition Government has shown concern over 
the nation’s declining social mobility, highlighted in Opening Doors, Breaking Barriers: A 
Strategy for Social Mobility, which identifies the private/state education divide at the root of 
the problem. However, despite this educational inequality and segregation, successive 
governments have not seen equality law as a tool of redress. This may because by tradition, 
distributive inequalities are dealt with only by political initiatives. The purpose of this article 
is to question this ‘tradition’ and evaluate whether using equality law in Britain as part of a 
social mobility agenda is justifiable, especially in education. 
 
The article concludes that discrimination law, based on school background, could play a 
significant part in employment, but technical issues make this less likely in education. 
However, a public sector equality duty extended to education could have a significant impact.  
 
Introduction 
 
Since it came into office in 2010, the Coalition Government has shown concern over 
Britain’s declining social mobility, highlighted by its publication of Opening Doors, 
Breaking Barriers: A Strategy for Social Mobility.
1
 In the meantime, the Minister for 
Education acknowledged his concern that social mobility was worse than in any comparable 
country.
2
  
 
This concern is not unique to the Coalition Government. The previous (New Labour) 
Government voiced similar concerns. And, nowadays, all the main political parties agree that 
Britain needs more social mobility.
3
 But an interesting change of policy towards social 
mobility appears to have come with the Coalition Government. New Labour focussed on 
social inclusion, that is, trying to bring those with no stake in society at least onto the bottom 
rung of the ladder.
4
 However, the Coalition has shifted the focus somewhat to the top of the 
ladder, and the domination of the top jobs by the private schools. The Conservative Minister 
for Education has identified the private/state education schism as the focus for attention. At 
various times he has declared that a problem at the heart of English education is ‘inequality’;5 
the private schools’ domination of public life was ‘morally indefensible’,6 that England’s 
‘dark secret’ was ‘one of the most stratified and segregated education systems of any 
developed nation’, and as well as the ethical objections, this waste of talent was ‘economic 
madness’ in an increasingly competitive world.7 
 
Having identified the principal problem as private school students’ being disproportionately 
represented in the nation’s top jobs, the Government wanted to raise standards in all schools, 
narrow the attainment gap, and raise aspirations in state schools.
8
 To these ends, it proposed, 
inter alia: only funding teacher-training for graduates with at least a 2:2 degree;
9
 special help 
for disadvantaged schools and pupils;
10
 and ‘impartial’ career advice on further and higher 
education, and apprenticeships, with an aim to provide high profile, inspirational speakers.
11
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Whilst these are laudable initiatives may narrow the gap, they fall well-short of closing the 
gap, and will leave some inequalities unaddressed. The teacher-training initiative does not bar 
the recruitment and retention of less-qualified teachers. Moreover, the policies make no 
comparison with more tangible signs of quality, such as private school funding, teacher 
qualifications and pay, and staff/student ratios. And whilst help for disadvantaged schools 
and pupils is welcome, its aspiration can only be to bring those up to the standard of the 
average state school, which the document itself acknowledges is inadequate and part of the 
problem.
12
 The careers initiative is again welcome, with the added discipline of a destinations 
measure to monitor its success.
13
 But much will turn on the values of this measure.  
 
At the heart of the shortfall is the Government’s reluctance to equalise, or even integrate, the 
state and private systems. Whilst Opening Doors is happy to compare the outcomes of state 
and private schools, and laud the ‘world class’ standing of the private sector,14 it fails to 
compare and contrast their practices, which are more likely to be at root of the diverse 
outcomes and inequality. It is apparent that the rhetoric identifying the problem – inequality, 
segregation - is not realised in any of the initiatives. This coincides with the legal shortfall: 
the absence of any equality law to address what would seem to be its natural targets: 
inequality and segregation. This may because by tradition, distributive inequalities are dealt 
with only by political initiatives. 
 
The purpose of this short article is to question this ‘tradition’ and evaluate whether the 
Government’s reluctance to use equality law as part of its social mobility agenda is 
justifiable, especially in education. To do this, it is necessary first, to explore the underlying 
values of the social mobility agenda, and second, whether equality law is suitable to address 
social immobility and education inequality, and whether it is on a par with established 
grounds (sex, race, religion, age etc.) to be readily integrated into the current equality law 
framework. Third, it considers, in brief, the potential impact of some equality laws - direct 
and indirect discrimination, positive action, and the public sector equality duties - in some 
key areas: employment recruitment, university admissions, and school recruitment. 
 
  
1. Social Mobility, Merit, and Education 
 
Although affording it an ‘economic dimension’, the Coalition Government considers social 
mobility principally a matter of fairness, one of three core values, along with freedom and 
responsibility.
15
 Thus, social mobility can be considered as a matter of fairness or economic 
efficiency, or both, presenting ethical and economic justifications for advancing social 
mobility. Inherent in these is a notion of merit: talent should not be frustrated by inferior life 
chances, such as schooling. Both the ethical and economic aspects are considered below in 
turn, but it will be seen that they often coincide. 
 
 
(1) The Ethical Dimension to Social Mobility 
 
Received wisdom is that social mobility has an ethical basis; it is ‘wrong’ that children born 
to uneducated, unenlightened, or non-wealthy, parents, have inferior life-chances. On these 
lines, according to the Coalition Government, a commitment to fairness brings ‘a strong 
ethical imperative to improve social mobility’, and this means that ‘the circumstances of a 
person’s birth’ should not ‘determine the life they go onto lead.’16 Underpinning a policy 
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with an ethical imperative may give it credibility, but it can also bring uncertainty. Consider 
these three possibilities of the ethics underpinning social mobility and merit.  
 
(a) Luck – you cannot choose your parents 
 
As an ‘ethical’ ideal, meritocracy is not entirely free from uncertainty. The received wisdom 
is that by rewarding a person on their innate abilities, we eschew privilege. And by privilege, 
we mean the luck of birth and the parents that went on to buy that privilege and pass on their 
know-how and contacts. But is there not just as much luck involved with the innate abilities 
of a person, normally determined pre-birth? This also is something over which the person has 
no control. Some abilities may run in the family, so there is the luck – not of the parents’ 
wealth – but of their innate abilities, with the further uncertainty of them being passed on 
genetically. There are other factors, such as the luck of the parents’ conduct during 
pregnancy: an expectant mother may have smoked and drank, or have taken narcotics, 
damaging the child’s innate abilities before it is born. This suggests that there is an ethical 
reason to redress the bad luck.  
 
However, a realisation of that principle could mean Government intervention on a scale at 
odds with modern liberal values. ‘Solutions’ could involve eugenics,17 including widespread 
forced sterilisations and marriages ‘arranged’ by the state. Many would argue that ‘ironing 
out’ these differences would produce a sterile society, drained of variety and the vicissitudes 
of life, while many parents would argue that they are better placed to choose each other as 
partners for sound reasons of compatibility. Meanwhile, any ‘compensation’ would involve a 
‘levelling down’ of performance standards and pay, as job applicants are treated according to 
what abilities they would have had; this, ironically, would degrade the competitive market 
economy, and is at odds with any economic justification for a meritocracy. 
 
Thus, as well as being practically problematic, a notion of social mobility cannot not include 
all those deprived of abilities because it is at odds with prevailing Western ethical, cultural 
and economic values.  
 
One cannot leave this theme without discounting a tempting parallel with disability 
discrimination law, which requires employers, educators, providers of services (among 
others) to make ‘reasonable adjustments’ for a person’s disability, suggesting that a degree of 
economic inefficiency is acceptable where justice demands. However, disability law has the 
advantage of being able to define its class by an absolute measure (ability to carry out normal 
day-to-day activities).
18
 By contrast, a pure ‘luck-based inability’ would be measured by 
establishing the abilities the individual would have had, but for the bad luck, which is a 
relative assessment and a practically impossible task. 
 
A second parallel can be made with disability discrimination theory. The social theory argues 
that the problem is not a person’s abilities, but society’s infrastructure and attitudes. A rare 
example of this realised in law is where severe disfigurements are be treated as if they 
substantially affected the person’s functional abilities,19 even though the disfigurement – say, 
a birthmark on the face - had no adverse functional effect. Here, the problem identified is not 
the birthmark, but society’s reaction to it. Using similar logic, it is arguable that for merit, the 
problem is the high value placed on innate ability. Western societies have created an 
economic system that values (or purports to value) competition, merit, and personal 
achievement; it is these societal values that put those with fewer innate abilities at the 
disadvantage. The meritocrat values personal fulfilment and achieving potential. A contrary 
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view would see this as a wasteful use of energy, with the meaningless goal to accumulate a 
list of achievements to be carved into a gravestone. Rest in peace instead. Again, this is too 
contrary to existing Western values to gain traction. 
 
All this indicates that any ethical basis lies elsewhere. Given that the preponderance of top 
jobs are occupied by the privately educated, perhaps an ethical basis lies in the privilege 
provided by private education or the notion of separate schooling being inherently unequal. 
 
 
(b) Merit and ‘unethical’ privilege 
 
If, contrary to the above proposition, we assume a person’s innate abilities are to be judged 
from the moment of birth, then the focus shifts to the education system and how it nurtures 
these abilities. After considering the matter in some depth, one-time Conservative Education 
Minister, George Walden, concluded that Britain operated an ‘apartheid system’ of 
education.
20
 This may be overstating the case somewhat. It is not an omnipresent racial 
segregation violently enforced by the police state. Nonetheless, the segregating barriers are 
formidable. In addition to the cultural deterrents for an ordinary boy or girl to attend one of 
Britain’s public schools, there is the financial barrier. By 2010 prices, average school fees for  
were £12,558 per year,
21
 whilst the average wage, before deductions, was £23,660.
22
 Simple 
maths (deduct e.g. tax, national insurance, pension contribution, rent or mortgage payments, 
household bills,  transport costs, etc.) informs us that the average family cannot choose to 
educate its children privately. So much so, the prospect is unthinkable. For those on the 
minimum wage (say, £12,064 pa),
23
 or unemployed, the prospect is laughably unthinkable. 
 
Does this unequal state of affairs present an ethical challenge? Well, private school pupils 
enjoy superior staff/student ratios, are more likely to be ‘fed’ into the most prestigious 
universities,
24
 and the conversion rate into top jobs disadvantages the non-wealthy. To 
aggravate matters, evidence suggests that persevering with the segregated system is actually 
damaging the state sector. As school fees rise above inflation, to keep up with ever-increasing 
education demands of the economy,
25
 more and more of the best teachers are drawn from the 
state to the private sector.
26
 The privileged do not enjoy their benefits in isolation. A high 
price is being exacted from the nation’s majority to fuel the minority’s benefits. This is an 
unattractive aspect of the educational privilege in Britain. It suggests that a fairer distribution 
of these benefits would not be the ‘politics of envy’, but an ethical matter of probity, justice, 
and fairness (as well as economic efficiency). 
 
(c) Segregation and inequality 
 
Suppose the ‘unethical privilege’ (above) were redressed. Thus, state schools, having enticed  
a fair proportion of the best teachers, and matched their private counterparts in all other 
indicators (such as class sizes), produced comparable exam results. Simple maths suggest that 
more private school pupils should be destined for lower paid jobs, manual work, 
apprenticeships, or a life on benefits. 
 
In this scenario, logic suggests that private education would dwindle away as no parent would 
pay twice
27
 for same thing. However, this logic is not compelling. It is perhaps more logical 
that independent schools, keen to retain or even enhance their kudos, will endeavour to offer 
something over and above the tangible indicators. In Britain of course, that would be the 
‘cultural capital’ personified by Britain’s private schools (such as confidence, self-esteem, 
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accent, manners, dining etiquette, deportment, and connections),
28
 which will have a residual 
value beyond the apparent worth of qualifications, and feed respective senses of superiority 
and inferiority. Thus, even in this scenario, with all other things equal, the state school 
graduate, attending an upper class dinner, would still be distinguished as the lonely antithesis 
of the etiquette of the room.
29
 Likewise, the Old Etonian will encounter similar difficulties on 
the factory floor or labouring on a building site. 
 
Other factors contribute. First, the cost
30
 of private education render it practically out of reach 
to the Non-wealthy, whose situation is – for all practical purposes - immutable. Second, 
although the law does not mandate the segregation, it does facilitate and support it, most 
notably by the charitable status afforded to private education.
31 
These factors can only drive 
home a deep sense of inferiority, which extends to a person’s ‘citizenship’ and ‘status in the 
community’. Such people are less likely to take part in civic life, such as sitting as a 
magistrate, standing for the local council, or voting in elections.
32
 Indeed, it was these factors 
that underpinned the outlawing of racially segregated education in the United States, 
famously, in Brown v Board of Education.
33
 This suggests that segregation per se, contributes 
to the problem. Of course, this essential problem of inferiority can be associated just as 
readily with mere ‘privilege’, as outlined above. The point here is that even if formal 
privilege were swept away, this problem would persist.  
 
It may seem curious to claim that a majority group is loaded with a sense of inferiority. But 
the statistics, notably the aspirations to the top universities,
34
 tend to bear this out. This is not 
as odd as it seems. Privileged minorities, such as the Royals and Aristocracy, have survived 
for centuries, whilst South African apartheid operated against the majority. Sometimes, it 
seems, people chose identity over improvement.
35
 
 
This suggests that a sense of inferiority would persist even when all other tangible school 
indicators were comparable. The sense of inferiority would extend into a person’s 
‘citizenship’ and ‘status in the community’. Such people are less likely to take part in civic 
life, such as sitting as a lay magistrate,
36
 standing for the local council, or voting in 
elections.
37
 This suggests that while the segregated school system exists, privilege and 
inequality cannot substantially be eroded.  
 
Of these three ethical considerations, the first can be dismissed for falling foul of prevailing 
Western values, and being practically unworkable. The second and third arguments share a 
similar definition of merit, and similar aims of children reaching their potential and 
contributing (and being rewarded) accordingly in adult life. The distinction is between the 
means to achieve these aims, with the third asserting that private school privilege can never 
be eroded whilst the private/state dichotomy persists. Before attempting any sort of judgment 
over these two arguments, there is another – economic - dimension, to consider. 
  
 
(2) The Economic Dimension to Social Mobility 
 
‘Whatever the goals of a community may be, they are most likely to be achieved when the 
individuals most capable of performing the tasks that promote those goals are allowed to do 
so. Such efficiency, it may be argued, requires a system that selects the ... ablest.’38  
 
That proposition, underpinning an ‘equality of opportunity’ policy, rings hollow whilst the 
nation provides inferior education and aspirations for the vast majority of its population. 
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Employers have to pick the ‘ablest’ from a pool of talent drawn from a tiny minority of its 
‘community’. Research shows that a more highly-skilled workforce could add four per cent to 
Gross National Product.
39
 By its nature privilege is anti-competitive, damaging the market 
economy, and international competitiveness.
40
 
 
For Western democracies, the link between education and the economic performance is 
becoming ever more important. Private schools have been aware of this for many years, 
shifting their emphasis to academic achievement. As such, in the past 20 years, school fees 
have doubled in real terms and parents – conscious of the ever-increasing need for academic 
achievement - have been willing to pay.
41
  
 
What this shows is that if merit is to be cherished for ethical and economic reasons, it must be 
based on a person’s innate abilities from birth, and cannot be fully realised with a privileged, 
and segregated, education system.  
 
There is no doubt that notions of merit, fairness and economic efficiency inform the 
Government’s social mobility agenda. However, there is no evidence that (despite the 
Education Secretary’s rhetoric) that desegregation is on this agenda. In any case, domestic 
discrimination law is not the ideal vehicle to dismantle the segregated school system, as no 
single defendant could be held responsible. This is a matter state policy and any legal 
challenge must be at a ‘constitutional’ level, the mostly likely here being under the European 
Convention on Human Rights, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
42
 
 
 
 
2. Is Equality Law Suitable To Address Social Immobility? 
 
 
To clarify the argument, it is necessary to clarify the problem, and to see how far it is a 
necessary consequence of the market economy.  
 
 
(1) Social Mobility and Education  
 
Research suggests that in Britain social mobility is static, if not in decline.
43
 In other words, 
children are more likely to replicate their parents’ achievements and aspirations, rather than 
participate fully in civil life and a competitive market economy. The following statistics show 
part played by education.
44
 Bear in mind that only about seven per cent of children are 
privately educated.
45
 
 
The new coalition cabinet, when formed in May 2010, contained 29 ministers, 18 of whom 
(62 per cent) were privately educated.
46
 In 2009, the Sutton Trust reported that some 70 per 
cent of the senior judiciary, 68 per cent of the leading chambers, and 55 per cent of partners 
in the ‘magic circle’ solicitors’ firms, were privately educated.47 Recently, the Sutton Trust 
found that half of ‘medics’48 were privately educated.49 Similar findings can be found 
elsewhere. In 2000, for instance, of those admitted to medical schools in the UK, over 80% 
were from social classes 1 or 2 (from 5 social classes).
50
 The Sutton Trust has found that 54 
per cent of top journalists and 54 per cent of chief executive officers of FTSE 100 
companies
51
 were privately educated. Government research found that for army officer 
training (at Sandhurst), private schools were over-represented, making up 42.3 per cent of the 
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2011/2012 graduates.
52
 The journey from school to a top job normally will be via a top 
university. Private school students are 55 times more likely to win a place at Oxbridge and 22 
times more likely to go to a top-ranked university than the poorest students at state schools.
53
 
 
This peculiarly British problem is recognised by the Coalition (as noted above),
54
 which 
points out that the influence of parental income on the income of children in Britain is among 
the strongest in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries: ‘The impact of parental income is over one and a half times higher in Great Britain 
than in Canada, Germany, Sweden or Australia’.55 
 
The contrast can be seen also in broader educational indicators. Between 2000 and 2009, 15-
year-olds in the UK have fallen from 4th to 16th in international rankings in science, from 7th 
to 25th in literacy and from 8th to 28th in maths.
56
 In a global economic context, Britain’s 
top-heavy allocation of education resources is outstanding. The OECD has found that the UK 
spends about half per pupil on its state schools in comparison with some 29 other nations, 
ranging from Hungry, Australia, the United States, Korea, and Mexico.
57
 Two further OECD 
reports illustrate what this means in the classrooms. The first highlights a discrepancy in class 
sizes, with private school classes about half that of their state counterparts. In a global 
context, this discrepancy is the widest in the survey. As the chart below vividly demonstrates, 
the United Kingdom has by far the widest discrepancy of the 28 nations surveyed, and is less 
egalitarian, for instance, than Turkey, Portugal, Mexico, Chile, and even the United States.
58
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The second report, on student/teacher ratios for secondary schools, presents a similar picture. 
For the state sector, whilst the OECD average was 13.4 (students per teacher), the United 
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Kingdom could only manage 15.7. By contrast, the UK’s ratio for the private sector was 7.5, 
bettering by far the OECD private school average of 12.1.
59
  
 
These figures show that that Britain has an exceptional coincidence between wealth and 
education, a coincidence that persists individual life chances. Overall, it is clear that Britain is 
labouring under a severe, widespread, and exceptional problem of inequality in education, 
which in turn feeds its problem of social immobility. The next question is whether equality 
law could address these problems. 
 
(2) The Basis of Existing Equality Law 
 
The first question is whether the characteristic of ‘school background’ is analogous to the 
present protected characteristics (of sex, race etc.), thus making it rather straightforward 
simply to add this to the existing equality law framework. The ‘mischief’ behind our sex and 
race discrimination legislation may sit comfortably under the banner of ‘institutional and 
societal disadvantage’, but within that broad definition, the issues relating to gender and race 
are quite distinguishable. In Britain, Caribbean and Asian immigration prompted the race 
relations legislation.
60
 Meanwhile, a quite different history is associated with the 
subordination of women.
61
 
 
There are geographical considerations as well. The European Commission considered the 
‘mischief’ behind the Race Directive was Europe’s 20th Century wars and conflicts, with the 
Directive contributing to the consequent ‘fight against racism’.62 In the Unites States, the 
Civil Rights Act 1964 was rooted in a history of slavery and segregation. Thus, not only do 
race and gender have distinguishable issues to address, race issues are distinguishable 
according to geography and timing.  
  
A banner of ‘institutional and societal disadvantage’ is even less accurate when considering 
the backgrounds to the other dedicated legislation, covering disability, sexual orientation, 
religion and belief, and age. For all these characteristics, the Framework Directive states: 
 
‘Discrimination ... may undermine the achievement of the objectives of the EC Treaty, in 
particular the attainment of a high level of employment and social protection, raising the 
standard of living and the quality of life, economic and social cohesion and solidarity, and the 
free movement of persons.’63 
 
And for older people in particular, the Directive was needed ‘to increase their participation in 
the labour force.’64 At face value, these reasons imply that the problems with discrimination 
on these grounds were unemployment (especially for older people), poor living standards, 
economic and social division, and restrictive free movement. Not only are these bases 
fragmented, they contain contradictions. For instance, a study of age discrimination law in the 
United States revealed that the chief beneficiaries were middle-class white males,
65
 which 
suggests that age discrimination does not sit comfortably under the banner of ‘institutional 
and societal disadvantage’, and, by favouring this sub-class, it may disfavour non-whites and 
women. Another instance is the ‘clash of rights’ between sexual orientation and religion, 
demonstrated by a growing body of case law.
66
  
 
Any notion of a co-ordinated or common theme is further undermined, not only by the 
inclusion of age, but by the fortuitous nature and timing of respective political campaigns. 
For instance, despite a long history of slavery, followed by a century of institutionalized 
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segregation, it took a single speech - Martin Luther King’s ‘I have a dream’ - to move 
President Kennedy to foster the Bill that would become the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
67
 In the 
UK, the daughter of the Minister for Disabled People drew huge public support by leading a 
campaign that embarrassed a reluctant government to introduce the Disability Discrimination 
Act 1995.
68
 The EU’s equal pay law was enshrined in the original Treaty of Rome at the 
insistence of the French: as France was the only country with an equal pay law at the time, 
French employers (not workers nor feminist groups) campaigned for its inclusion in the 
Treaty to avoid unfair competition from other member states.
69
 Gender was introduced into 
the Civil Rights Act 1964 as a wrecking amendment, the proposer believing that Congress 
would never vote for it.
70
 
 
A broader aspect of timing relates to changing values. As some judges maintain, statutes 
entrenching fundamental rights are living instruments, to interpreted according to the values 
of the day.
71
 It took just 60 years for the US Supreme Court (in Brown v Board of 
Education
72
) to reverse its opinion that racial segregation was Constitutionally equal,
73
 
noting, that the value equality cannot be judged in isolation or frozen in time.
74
 Since Brown 
was decided in 1954, mainstream Western society has recognised as unjust the disadvantages 
suffered by women, religions, beliefs, homosexuals, transsexuals, the elderly, and those with 
disabilities. Sometimes, values may be driven by changing circumstances. In recent years, for 
instance, an increase in obesity, along with glamour, celebrity, and ‘body image’, there are 
concurrent arguments for legal protection against ‘fattism’75 and ‘lookism’.76  
 
If there were a notion underpinning the more recent grounds (and arguments), it is the rise of 
individualism, which readily transposes Martin Luther King’s famous saw, that people should 
be judged by the content of their character, rather than the colour of their skin.
77
 The West’s 
shift from collective to individual values is graphically demonstrated in the UK by the decline 
of trade union membership and corresponding increase in individual employment rights, and 
the passing of the Human Rights Act 1998.
78
 More particularly, if one delves into the 
foremost theories underpinning discrimination law, ranging from formal equality, equality of 
opportunities, to equality of outcomes, the dominant theme explaining existing equality law is 
‘equality of opportunities’. It is common for the phrase to introduce equality legislation.79 It 
is a mantra of political rhetoric, and of employers signalling their compliance with existing 
equality legislation. 
 
In recent years the circumstances are that the value of education has increased greatly and the 
competitive market economy has prevailed, whilst social mobility has waned and the wealth 
gap widened. Meanwhile, individualism and equality of opportunities demand that people 
have a right to participate fairly in this economy. All this coincides with Coalition’s professed 
values of fairness and economic efficiency, which are to be realised, it says, by equality of 
opportunities.
80
  
 
The increasingly competitive market economy, rise of individualism and the value of fairness  
all coincide to suggest that a ‘right’ to social mobility, and in particular, for the state-school 
educated to compete fairly in the market economy, is a right on a par with existing grounds 
considered apt for dedicated equality law (such as sex, race, religion, age, etc.).  
 
4. The New Law 
 
No doubt, the drafting of an anti-discrimination law centred on school backgrounds would 
present new challenges. But this not a reason to abandon the project. The later generations of 
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protected characteristics, such as disability (1995),
81
 sexual orientation,
82
 religion
83
 (2003), 
and age (2006),
84
 each presented new challenges to the drafters and the courts.  
 
Assuming the political will existed to introduce ‘school background’ as a protected 
characteristic within the existing equality law framework, the first question is technical, 
should it adopt a symmetrical model? Once that is resolved, the second question is how far it 
could contribute to the social mobility agenda. It was noted above
85
 that the social mobility 
agenda aspires to equality of opportunities, achieved mainly through equality in education. It 
does not extend desegregation.   
 
 
(1) Symmetrical or asymmetrical? 
 
Most domestic discrimination law models can be classed symmetrical or asymmetrical. The 
symmetrical model dominates, which provides for equal treatment of women and men, blacks 
and whites, Jews and atheists, gay and straight, and so on. However, the law provides some 
asymmetrical models, notably for pregnancy,
86
 disability,
87
 and positive action,
88
 where the 
disadvantaged group is singled out for protection, with no corresponding protection for non-
members of the group in question.  
 
In the related context of social inclusion, Sandra Fredman has argued that discrimination on 
socio-economic grounds should be couched in non-symmetrical terms
89
 because it ‘risks the 
possibility of challenges by better off people against programmes specifically designed to 
benefit poor people.
90
 This argument has force in the education context, where the many 
initiatives would become vulnerable to equal treatment claims by the privileged. Perhaps the 
most vivid and controversial of these is the lowering of A-level grade requirements for state 
school applicants, an initiative taken by a few universities.
91
 Such an initiative could be 
challenged by private schools and/or their pupils as unequal treatment based on school 
background.
92
  
 
On the other hand, a symmetrical model has political and economic advantages. Politically, 
affording protection to rich and poor, privileged and underprivileged, would undermine 
typical criticisms using the ‘politics of envy’ and ‘class war’ slogans. If an economic goal of 
social mobility is to utilise a broader pool of talent, permitting discrimination against the 
privileged is likely to keep them away from the less attractive jobs (where they might face 
prejudice), then logic dictates that a disproportionate amount of the less privileged will 
remain in these jobs. As noted above,
93
 social mobility has to work two ways. 
 
Ideally then, the best of both models is required. Fredman advocates that the definition 
‘socio-economic disadvantage’ (provided by the not-in-force section 1 of the Equality Act 
2010) resolves the problem in that context, with the rider that the inclusion of the word 
disadvantage excludes symmetrical claims by the better off. Such a formula would not 
facilitate the two-way street envisaged above in the context of school background. So, 
another solution is required. Of the asymmetrical ‘exceptions’ noted above, just one – 
positive action - relates to Fredman’s concerns. Positive action is permitted at domestic, 
EU,
94
 and European Human Rights
95
 levels. The domestic and EU versions actually 
accompany the symmetrical direct discrimination formulas. The Equality Act 2010, for 
instance, simply disapplies any contradictory parts of the Act where positive action falls 
within specified limits.
96
 This is discussed in more detail below.
97
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Thus, the upper class schoolboy should be protected from discrimination on the factory floor, 
whilst a university may proceed with its attempts to secure a proportionate number of state 
school entrants, despite their generally lower A-level grades, without fear of legal attack by 
private schools.  
 
 
This second question requires a consideration of how this discrimination law might operate in 
the contexts of work, school and university.  
 
(2) Employment Recruitment  
 
 
The Government’s social mobility agenda is largely informed by the under-representation of 
state-school graduates in the top jobs. It is reasonable to assume that one strand of this agenda 
would be the outlawing of employment discrimination against state school graduates. It does 
not take much imagination to envisage some obvious cases: 
 
 Online application forms providing only private schools as an option.98 
 
 A pattern of hiring/promotion favouring private school graduates.99 
 
There are likely to be some less obvious cases. An employer may express a preference for a 
particular private school (say, his Alma Mata). This lies somewhere between hiring from 
family or friends (permitted
100) and hiring only those who share the employer’s 
characteristic
101
 (generally not permitted
102
). The notion of old school chums working 
together sounds less romantic when recast as ‘old school tie’ nepotism, especially when it 
occurs in highly paid employment. Further grey areas will produce difficulties. A privately-
educated employer may prefer the presentation skills of one candidate over another, unaware 
that his reason was the more familiar accent of candidate over - what he considered – the 
vulgar alternative. Such an employer may also have been impressed with the private-school 
candidate’s grammar, deployment of Shakespearean metaphors, and references to the 
Classics, and correspondingly dismayed with another’s split infinitives and misplaced 
prepositions. Other issues might centre on the soft skills (see above)
103
 associated with 
private schools, say, confidence, leadership, and so on. 
 
These reactions could mask a simple homophilic tendency (of selecting/trusting those 
socially similar
104
), which is thus replicated throughout the business. Of course, logic dictates 
that favouring one group disfavours another, and in this case would directly discriminate 
against state-school graduates. Such cases may present difficult issues of proof, but no more 
so than existing ‘borderline’ or apparently nebulous cases. As the House of Lords has 
observed, sex and race discrimination claims ‘present special problems of proof ... since those 
who discriminate ... do not in general advertise their prejudices: indeed, they may not even be 
aware of them.’105 
 
Should the employer’s reactions be formalised to some degree, such scenarios may be 
expressed as (prima facie) indirect discrimination.
106
 This is likely to occur where the 
employer claims that the presentation skills, confidence, and leadership were job-related 
characteristics, and applied equally to state and private school candidates. Here, a prima facie 
case might depend on, say, the improbability of being taught grammar (and/or Latin) in a 
state school, and then whether the employer’s preference is genuine and necessary. One 
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danger for employers here would be for those hiring staff to deal directly with clients. Those 
at the top end of any particular market are likely to express a need for their staff to identify 
with its clients. This argument, rather than defending indirect discrimination, risks admitting 
direct discrimination, if identifying with clients is a mere pretext to hire only those from 
(certain) private schools. The straightforward ‘customer preference’ defence, akin to claiming 
‘I’m not a racist, but my customers prefer white girls’, would perpetuate the stereotypes that 
the law was designed to eradicate. Further, for other protected characteristics, it has been 
roundly rejected by the courts.
107
 Thus, any such defence would have to be tailored to the 
skills required, rather than the type of school attended. Even so, unless convincing, where the 
batch of skills coincides with the classic private-school prototype, it may well be found to be 
a mere pretext for direct discrimination. 
 
If employers elect on merit, expressed as the best qualified, the impact of such a law may 
only be marginal, although not necessarily insignificant. As highlighted above, the root of the 
problem lies at the education level, before any employer decision-making occurs. If all 
employers – of their own volition or by the force of law - recruit the best qualified candidates, 
and the private schools produce the best qualified candidates, then the bulk of social mobility 
problem is likely to remain. What little research there is suggests that employers already 
recruit largely on ‘merit’. A study of the most apparently elitist of professions, the bar of 
England and Wales, found a close relationship between ‘merit’ and recruitment: ‘...education, 
measured as university attended and attainment at university and in the BVC was the most 
powerful predictors of gaining pupillage.’108 This seemingly exonerating finding does expose 
a potential flaw in the recruitment to top jobs. It is unsurprising that the best universities were 
considered to be Oxford and Cambridge. There may be a case against an Oxbridge bias if it 
cannot be shown, all other things being equal, that an Oxbridge candidate is better qualified 
than other university graduates who performed equally well. This argument applies also on a 
wider basis, where employers choose from a broader range of what is commonly accepted as 
‘good’ universities either ranging from the ‘Russell Group’109 through to post-92 ‘new’ 
universities, or a perhaps more scientific approach based on the various league tables. The 
essential weakness here is that the reputations and league tables tend to indicate which 
university provides the best education for students, but not necessarily which (if any) 
provides the best employees. If a student from a top-ten university achieves a 2:1 honours, 
there is a logic that suggests that her counterpart from a university some 100 places lower in 
the league tables was a whole lot brighter to have achieved his 2:1. The point is that the logic 
of preferring candidates from ‘top’ universities should be tested: if the preference for a ‘top 
university’ adversely affects state school students, it should be objectively justified.  
 
A second flaw associated with the ‘best qualified’ approach lies in the nature of the job. If the 
qualifications required are not necessary to do the job, and tend screen out state school 
graduates, then the practice is vulnerable to a classic claim of indirect discrimination, 
epitomised in the seminal US case Griggs v Duke Power.
110
 That said, the impact is unlikely 
to be major, as qualifications are necessary for many, although not all, of the top jobs.  
 
Although compelling employers to objectively justify these preferences is likely to have only 
a limited direct impact on social immobility, it might indirectly produce some wider benefits. 
Under such a mandate, employers will become more objective in their decision-making. This 
in turn will send out a signal to a broader audience, raising awareness of the issue, not least 
upon schools and parents, that privilege will not trump merit. This ought to provide more 
state-school children with hope and the consequent incentive and ambition. Beyond that, the 
publics’ expectation – as clients and customers – that certain professionals ought to be ‘posh’ 
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should revise into something more rational and objective, which turn would feed back into 
employer’s recruitment strategies. 
 
Overall, subjecting employers to anti-discrimination legislation is likely to make a significant 
contribution, some of which is indirect, to the social mobility policy. The focus now shifts to 
education, beginning with higher education.  
 
 
(2) Higher Education 
 
Assuming that those in the top jobs are predominantly university-educated, and within that, 
from the elite universities,
111
 the obvious stage for scrutiny is the universities’ selection 
processes. The usual practice of preferring good A-level grades will tend to favour private 
schools, which, on the whole, outperform the state schools by this measure, and is certainly 
the excuse used by universities with an unbalanced state/private school cohort.
112
 
 
At present, universities have the freedom to experiment, explore, and tailor their admissions 
requirements to an optimum. Yet the vast majority do not do this, sticking to the ‘pure A-
level’ requirement. (One particular driver of this is Britain’s university league tables, most of 
which include A-level entrance requirements as an indicator of quality.) This inertia signals 
the need for legal intervention. 
 
Assuming a particular pure A-level admissions policy requirement is shown to adversely 
affect state school graduates, the university’s most likely argument would be that the policy is 
objectively justified as the best indicator of degree performance. What is absent from this 
argument is a recognition that A-level grades, if taken in isolation, are not the optimal 
predictor of degree performance, even though they may be the single most reliable predictor. 
In legal terms, it might be reasonable to use them alone, but not necessary. Research suggests 
that, at degree level, state school children out-perform their private school counterparts 
arriving with comparative (or better) A-level grades.
113
 As such, it is likely that the university 
would have to show that their state and private school students perform comparatively, for 
instance, by showing that in a particular subject, A-level grades alone are the most reliable 
predictor of degree performance. 
 
It does not necessarily follow that a broader admissions policy is a guarantee against 
discrimination. For example, a department may use interviews to complement the A-level 
requirements. This could ameliorate the arbitrary nature of a ‘pure A-level’ policy, by 
favouring state school applicants in borderline cases. But it is double-edged,
114
 carrying a 
‘face-fits’ or homophilic (social similarity) risk of preferring students with whom the panel 
most easily identify, and/or who best replicates previous cohorts.
115
 
 
Thus, a more reliable policy ought to begin with monitoring the relationship between A-level 
grades, schools attended, and degree performance. If this reveals a pattern of state school 
students outperforming their private school counterparts (all other factors being equal), it 
would a support a proportionate adjustment in favour state school applicants. In time, with 
more data and experience, this might be refined, with a further adjustments on, say, school-
by-school and subject-by-subject bases. 
 
There is a technical issue here. Assuming the proposed law were symmetrical,
116
 any 
adjustment apparently favouring state schools, no matter how justified, would be facially 
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discriminatory against private schools, and as such be vulnerable to a challenge of direct 
discrimination from private school applicants. This would leave universities walking a 
tightrope, with a pure A-level policy vulnerable to indirect discrimination, yet any adjustment 
to objectively justify and avert such claims is likely to attract a direct discrimination claim.
117
 
More generally, it would inhibit departments from exploring and experimenting various 
admissions policies, enabling them to tailor their requirements to an optimum. The irony is 
that at present most do not do this, and a discrimination law dedicated to forcing their hand, 
would in fact prevent any action. As such, a statutory provision would be required permitting 
(and defining) positive action. This is discussed below. 
 
 
(3) Schools 
 
Below university level, schools tend use a broader range of indicators for selection, including 
ability to pay, academic potential (measured by previous school performance and/or entrance 
exams), interviews, and catchment area. Any of these can indirectly discriminate against state 
school children, although, as the age range descends from Sixth Form, through Senior, Prep 
and Nursery levels, there is a corresponding reduction of potential to discriminate on the 
basis of the applicant’s school background. However, there may be a corresponding tendency 
to select on the basis of the school(s) attended by the parents. If the existing formula of direct 
discrimination were adopted, outlawing, say, ‘less favourable treatment because of 
educational background’ (omitting the possessive adjective ‘his educational background’), it 
would be broad enough to cover this.
118
 
 
At sub-university level, a discrimination law centred on educational background, whilst 
consistent with the social mobility agenda, is likely only to make a significant contribution at 
Sixth Form level, perhaps tapering somewhat at Nursery level. 
 
Here, it becomes apparent that the specific problem of educational privilege is more closely 
related to wealth, rather than school background. The logical conclusion is legislation 
outlawing discrimination by schools on the basis of wealth, which would be realised as an 
ability to pay fees.
119
 Of course, such a regime, in isolation, would see the financial ruin of 
most – if not all – of Britain’s private schools. Thus, discrimination law, at least in isolation, 
is not a solution, which would be political in nature.
120
 Discrimination law, based on school 
background, could complement the political initiatives on social mobility. But, as will be seen 
below, this limited impact may not be enough to warrant its inclusion. 
 
 
(4) Positive Action 
 
A major contribution the social mobility agenda would be through university admissions. As 
noted above, any adjustment of A-level grade requirements favouring state school graduates 
runs the risk of directly discriminating against the private school graduates. As such, a 
proviso permitting positive action would be required. Again, for the sake of consistency and 
ease of administration by those bound, this discussion is based on existing definitions of 
positive action. 
 
The general formula is provided by section 158 of the Equality Act 2010, which in turn is 
informed by EU law.
121
 It applies to all fields within the Act, such as education, the provision 
of services, and some aspects of employment, save that it does not apply where s.104 
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(election candidates) or s.159 (work recruitment and promotion) applies.
122
 
 
Section 158(1) provides three triggers and corresponding aims that may be pursued. If a 
person ‘reasonably thinks’ that either:  
 
(a) persons who share a protected characteristic suffer a disadvantage connected to the 
characteristic (‘disadvantaged’), 
 
(b) persons who share a protected characteristic have needs that are different from the needs 
of persons who do not share it (‘different needs’), or 
 
(c) participation in an activity by persons who share a protected characteristic is 
disproportionately low (‘underrepresented’). 
  
Accordingly, s.158(2) permits action which is a proportionate means of achieving the aim of: 
(a) enabling or encouraging persons who share the protected characteristic to overcome or 
minimise that disadvantage, 
(b) meeting those needs, or 
(c) enabling or encouraging persons who share the protected characteristic to participate in 
that activity. 
 
 
Section 158(2) provides the EU-derived principle that the means used in pursuit of the aim 
would have to be ‘proportionate’. The first thing to note here is that the positive action under 
discussion here applies only to (higher) education, and not the job market per se. It is more 
concerned with equality of opportunity than equality of results, and so is more likely to be 
proportionate.
123
  
 
For the policy itself, any adjustment of A-level grades for state school applicants would have 
to be no more than necessary to achieve the aim, in this case, fair representation. An 
adjustment informed by a ‘best predictor’ principle124 is very likely to be proportionate, if for 
no other reason, it would have no impact on quality other than improving it. Of course, in the 
early years of such positive action, the policy may not prove to be entirely accurate. But s.158 
is broad enough to accommodate some experimentation. For instance, if a particular course 
shows state school graduates out-performing their private school counterparts (with the same 
A-level grades) by, say, ten percentage points on their final year average grade, the university 
can only estimate what adjustment is required. It would take several years to see the results of 
just one round of recruitment, and several more years (and perhaps tweaks) for the figures to 
become constant and reliable. And even then, assuming the social mobility policy is working, 
the private/state school performance gap ought to be closing. Further, courses and methods of 
assessment will changing, and new ones will come on stream. This means the state/private A-
level grade profiles are liable to constant change, and so universities would have to react, not 
only to their internal ‘performance’ figures and course changes, but also to the constantly 
changing external situation. In addition, positive action policies generally require periodic 
review because of their transitional nature. ‘Otherwise, such forms of positive discrimination 
may, in the long run, create entrenched rights even when the original conditions justifying 
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them are no longer present’.125 Thus a genuine attempt, based on sufficient data, ought to 
prove proportionate, even if proved not to be entirely accurate. 
 
One difficulty here is, at EU level, case law is hostile to a straightforward tie-break between 
equally qualified candidates,
126
 a fortiori where a lesser qualified applicant is preferred, 
which is what would happen under this policy.
127
 In a sense, it is arguable that where, say, 
two applicants, one state, one private, each have 3 ‘B’ grades, the state school applicant will 
be preferred. Reduced to this, it appears to be a tie-break, because of two equally-qualified 
applicants, one is preferred because of a ‘protected characteristic’. But this is misleading, 
because the policy has redefined what is meant by ‘qualified’. This is not just a matter of 
semantics. Under this policy, the best qualified applicants are those predicted to perform the 
best at degree level. This is reflected in s.159, which permits tie-breaks in the employment 
field, where two candidates were as qualified as each other, rather than equally qualified to: 
‘Formal qualifications are only one way in which a candidate’s overall suitability may be 
assessed.’128 The phrase envisages a broad range of factors in this equation, such as 
experience, aptitude, physical ability, or performance during an interview or assessment. 
Where one candidate may have a better aptitude, another may be as qualified as him because 
she has superior experience. This logic translates readily to a university’s admissions policy. 
 
Apart for the ‘best predictor’ principle, there are other moderating factors. The state school 
applicant would not be preferred ‘automatically and unconditionally’.129 The private school 
applicant could be a mature student whose life experience overrides other factors. There may 
be too few applicants from the state sector, thus permitting more private school applicants to 
be accepted. Thus, the policy, limited by the ‘best predictor’ rubric could be proportionate to 
the aim of achieving a fair representation of state school graduates.  
 
A ‘best predictor’ policy is just one means of admitting more state school graduates. It is 
particularly safe because of its association with quality. But s.158 ought to permit other 
schemes, even where there is an impact on quality, as long as the benefits are not outweighed 
by this impact. Without the ‘best predictor’ limit, the other moderating factors could well 
render a preference for state school applicants proportionate, although the ECJ has shown 
hostility to moderating factors which are not unambiguous, transparent and ‘amenable to 
review’.130 As such, moderating factors applied with, say, an Admissions Tutor’s discretion 
(i.e. subjectively) are unlikely to satisfy this requirement. On the other hand, a rule filling 
empty places with private school applicants would appear to validate an otherwise suspect 
scheme.
131
 It follows that an extreme policy that dropped all A-level requirements and 
recruited by quota would be very unlikely to satisfy scrutiny.
132
 
 
 
(5) The Problem with the Symmetrical Model in Education 
 
Suppose a university department, having adopted a best predictor model, achieves its goal of 
a fair representation of state school students (93 per cent of its cohort). Also, suppose that the 
model proved to be a better predictor of degree performance than the previous ‘pure A-level’ 
policy. Now, the department wishes to maintain the policy as a more accurate predictor of 
degree performance. The problem with this aim is that is has nothing to do with positive 
action, and so would be exposed to a claim of direct discrimination from private school 
applicants. And if it reverts to the pure A-level policy, it risks an indirect discrimination 
claim from state school applicants. 
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There are some ways round this. The same policy could have another or concurrent aim: to 
prevent the state/private profile slipping back to its unbalanced state before the 
commencement of the positive action. This has the flavour of positive action, but still carries 
the problem that state school graduates are no longer under-represented on the course. As 
such, the trigger (under-representation) permitting the policy no longer exists. It would, of 
course, be rather perverse if the department were compelled by anti-discrimination law to 
revert to the pure A-level policy until state school graduates were – once again – under-
represented. But this need not be so. There may still exist under-representation in the job 
market, especially one fed by the course in question. If this were a medical or law degree, the 
job market is fairly quantifiable. Other degrees may feed a broader range of jobs. But general 
statistics showing under-representation in relevant professions should be an adequate trigger, 
albeit, one step removed.
133
 
 
This is only a partial solution. Once the job-market representation becomes fair, then the 
department has the same problem. A second solution lies in looking beyond the triggers in 
s.158, but remaining consistent with EU principles. The three main equality directives each 
provide for positive action with the aim of ‘ensuring full equality in practice’.134 Thus, it 
would seem that once equality were achieved, to ensure it, would cover a policy designed to 
prevent inequality returning, or arising in the first place.
135
 
 
A third solution lies again in positive action, but this time beyond the EU stricture of 
‘ensuring equality’. Case law in the United States permits positive action under the equal 
Protection Clause, if it is to serve a ‘compelling interest’ and is narrowly tailored to achieve 
that goal. (These correspond roughly to ‘legitimate aim’ and ‘proportionality’.) In Grutter v 
Bollinger
136
 the University of Michigan’s Law School included in its admissions policy the 
School’s commitment to diversity, which was to contribute to the Law School’s character and 
the legal profession. It made special reference to African-American, Hispanic and Native-
American students, who otherwise may not be included in meaningful numbers. Accordingly, 
the School admitted a ‘critical mass’ of underrepresented minority students. Quotas were not 
used. The Supreme Court sanctioned this admissions policy.
137
  
 
Although the US Supreme Court is generally wary of positive action, its ‘compelling interest’ 
rubric is broader than s.158’s three triggers, or the EU’s ‘ensuring equality’ principle. In 
Grutter, the goal was diversity, rather than equality. Further, this goal may have been at a cost 
of academic standards (strictly defined), although no more than necessary.
138
 Thus, if the UK 
were to adopt a broad positive action exception, permitting such aims as achieving social 
(class) diversity, university departments would have more leeway with their admissions 
policies. The goal of ‘ensuring equality’ suggests some equivalence of academic standards 
(by A-level grades and/or degree performance), whereas a goal of diversity permits more 
flexibility in strict academic standards. 
 
Again, these are incomplete solutions. It may be that state school graduates have always been 
fairly represented on a particular course and its relevant job market. There would be no need 
for further diversity. And so, where the ‘best predictor’ policy has the sole aim of optimising 
degree performance, and is facially discriminatory, positive action provisions cannot save it 
from a charge of direct discrimination. At this point, where principle seems exhausted, it is 
tempting to introduce a ‘pragmatic’ exception: here to ring-fence best predictor policies. But 
this would allow universities to ignore other legal imperatives to improve the representation 
of state school students, thus undermining the purpose of the legislation: where that best 
predictor happens to favour private schools, we are back to square one.  
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It would seem that the problems stemming from the symmetrical formula of direct 
discrimination are not resolvable fully with the positive action rubric, no matter how broadly 
drafted. This leaves several alternatives. First, abandon the symmetrical formula, and instead 
use an asymmetrical one, enabling only state school victims to sue for discrimination in 
higher education. The main advantages to a symmetrical formula
139
 are in the employment 
field, and so its abolition here will not have a major impact. But an inconstant structure would 
cause confusion, which tends to leave the law rather discredited, and so less effective. 
Second, abandon the symmetrical formula throughout the fields of application. This loses the 
considerable advantages in the employment field. Third, abandon discrimination law for 
higher education altogether, giving academic freedom to admissions policies. No ‘shelter’ of 
positive action would be required when devising admissions policies. The problem here is 
that hitherto, universities have rarely used this freedom, doggedly adhering to the pure A-
level grade formula. A fourth possibility would be to afford direct discrimination a general 
objective justification defence, following the model for age discrimination.
140
 This would 
afford some leeway to an admissions policy, but it does not guarantee certainty. There could 
be challenges ‘testing’ the objective justification of a variety of policies, producing a raft of 
fact-sensitive case law of little precedential value. The implications for the employment field 
would be far more serious, with employers pleading, among others, the ‘customer preference’ 
defence, thus maintaining the private school domination of certain professions and 
undermining the purpose of the law.  
 
None of these option appear particularly palatable, but they may be better appreciated in 
context of a parallel public sector equality duty. 
 
 
(6) Public Sector Equality Duty 
 
Whatever the choice of possibilities (above), it would be logical to enact a ‘public sector 
equality duty’ similar to the existing public sector equality duty.141 The present ‘general duty’ 
is set out by EA 2010, s.149: 
 
‘(1) A public authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the 
need to- 
 
(a) eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is 
prohibited by or under this Act; 
(b) advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected 
characteristic and persons who do not share it; 
(c) foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic 
and persons who do not share it.’ 
 
 
This duty applies to Higher Education.
142
 In contrast to the individual rights, it is enforceable 
only by the Equality and Human Rights Commission,
143
 following an ‘assessment’ of 
compliance.
144
 
 
Of the duty itself, the tone was set in Secretary of State for Defence v Elias:
145
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‘It is the clear purpose of [the equality duty] to require public bodies ... to give 
advance consideration to issues of ... discrimination before making any policy 
decision that may be affected by them. This is a salutary requirement, and this 
provision must be seen as an integral and important part of the mechanisms for 
ensuring the fulfilment of the aims of anti-discrimination legislation. ... In the context 
of the wider objectives of anti-discrimination legislation, [the equality duty] has a 
significant role to play.’146 
 
On the other hand, ‘due regard’ is not a duty to achieve a result. It meant: 
 
‘the regard that is appropriate in all the circumstances. These include on the one hand 
the importance of the areas of life of the members of the disadvantaged racial group 
that are affected by the inequality of opportunity and the extent of the inequality; and 
on the other hand, such countervailing factors as are relevant to the function which the 
decision-maker is performing.’147 
 
 
Section 149(6) reminds authorities that complying with the duties ‘may involve treating some 
persons more favourably than others’ thus permitting (lawful) positive action.148 
 
If being of a ‘state school background’ were added as a protected characteristic, this duty 
would suggest, at the least, in advance of the setting of requirements (typically the A-level 
grades) for the next intake, reviewing state/private balance for each course, and, where there 
is an imbalance, evaluating the possibilities of alternative admissions requirements, designed 
to improve the balance. The countervailing factor would be the time and expense of this. 
However, as one obvious model (‘best predictor’) has been used for over a decade at 
university at least, and which has published its data,
149
 the task should be relatively 
straightforward. In time, as records and statistics build, and the probability of specialist 
software becoming available, the process should become close to automatic. Given the 
relatively modest countervailing factors, the ‘due regard’ duty alone ought to compel 
universities to take these steps, at the least, on an annual basis. 
 
Of course, where favouring state school applicants would entail a fall in quality, a university 
could argue this to be an overwhelming countervailing factor. Here, universities may have 
more discretion. Nonetheless, under this duty, universities should consider ‘soft’ policies of 
positive action (permissible by s.158), such as such as targeting more state schools in 
recruitment.
150
 This ought to mean no more than reallocating resources, rather than spending 
more. 
 
 
If this general duty proved inadequate, the Government has power to impose specific duties. 
Section 153 of the Equality Act 2010 authorises a Minister of the Crown, Welsh Minister, or 
Scottish Minister to impose specific duties on a relevant public authority, which includes 
schools and further and higher education institutions. However, the Coalition Government 
introduced a new ‘light touch’ approach, moving away from what it considered a process-
driven top-down model, to a localised and transparent one.
151
 Those authorities covered will 
set their own targets (at least one ‘equality objective’),152 rather than have them set by central 
government. Other than that, they need do no more than ‘publish information to demonstrate 
its compliance’ with the general duty.153 The Welsh and Scottish executives have gone a little 
further, showing that the specific duties need not be limited to the English version. As they 
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stand, the English duties could do little but compliment to the general duty. However, there 
remains potential to target university admissions with more specific requirements. 
 
If combined with asymmetrical discrimination law (options one or two, above), university 
departments would enjoy some freedom to explore and experiment, being free of the main 
threat, a direct discrimination claim by private school graduates. If there were no 
discrimination law binding universities’ admissions (option three), the need to eliminate 
discrimination etc. (s.149(1)(a)) is rather diminished. But departments would enjoy the 
maximum freedom in admissions, confined mainly by the need to advance equality of 
opportunity between state and private school graduates. Under option four, departments risk 
direct discrimination claims and complexity of structuring policies to comply with an 
uncertain objective justification test. Whatever option were in place, the obligation to 
advance ‘equality of opportunity’ (s.149(1)(b)) between state and private school graduates 
would remain highly relevant.  
 
Overall, it would seem for the sake of consistency, clarity and public support, and the limited 
impact of discrimination law at school level, it would be better to confine discrimination law 
to the employment field, but places education under the equality duty. This reserves the most 
academic freedom in admissions policies, especially for the purpose of academic quality. It 
lacks the compulsion that should come about under the threat of legal challenges of 
discrimination, typically to the ‘pure A-level’ policies, but goes further than merely 
permitting universities to reconsider their admissions policies in light of the social mobility 
agenda (something, so far, they have failed generally to do). Where private school graduates 
are over-represented on courses, universities would be obliged to consider the impact of an 
admissions policy, to collect data, and adjust their admissions policies, certainly where it 
would have no adverse impact on quality.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The statistics support the British Government’s concern over the lack of social mobility in 
Britain and its relationship with the state/private education divide, a problem unmatched in 
any other comparable nation. In addition to economic efficiency, the increasingly competitive 
market economy, rise of individualism and the value of fairness all coincide to suggest that a 
‘right’ to social mobility, and in particular, for the state-school educated to compete fairly in 
the market economy, is a right on a par with existing grounds considered apt for dedicated 
equality law (such as sex, race, religion, age, etc.). Thus, the ‘tradition’ of confining 
distributive inequalities to political initiatives can no longer be justified. However, no 
Government initiative goes so far as suggesting that the school system should be 
desegregated, only that the gap between them should be reduced. That said, equality law 
clearly can make a significant contribution towards this goal.  
 
The areas examined, employment recruitment and educational admissions, suggest that 
(direct and indirect) discrimination law has a significant part to play in employment, but 
technical issues make this less likely in education. However, a public sector equality duty 
extended to education could have a significant impact in university admissions. 
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